49 lines
1.7 KiB
Plaintext
49 lines
1.7 KiB
Plaintext
/**
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* @name Server-side request forgery
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* @description Making a network request with user-controlled data in the URL
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* allows for request forgery attacks.
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @security-severity 9.1
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* @precision high
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* @id js/request-forgery
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-918
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*/
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import javascript
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import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.RequestForgeryQuery
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import RequestForgeryFlow::PathGraph
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/**
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* Treat calls to validateFederationUrl() as a request-forgery sanitizer.
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*
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* validateFederationUrl (apps/server/src/utils/validate-url.ts) validates that
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* a URL does not target private or internal network resources by:
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* - Rejecting non-HTTP(S) schemes
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* - Checking the hostname against private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local)
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* - Resolving DNS and checking resolved IPs against the same private ranges
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*
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* The function throws if the URL is unsafe, so if execution continues past the
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* call, the returned URL object is safe to fetch. Marking the call node as a
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* barrier prevents taint from flowing through the return value.
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*/
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private class ValidateFederationUrlSanitizer extends RequestForgery::Sanitizer {
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ValidateFederationUrlSanitizer() {
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
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call.getCalleeName() = "validateFederationUrl" and
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this = call
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)
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}
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}
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from
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RequestForgeryFlow::PathNode source, RequestForgeryFlow::PathNode sink,
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DataFlow::Node request
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where
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RequestForgeryFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
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request = sink.getNode().(RequestForgery::Sink).getARequest()
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select request, source, sink, "The $@ of this request depends on a $@.",
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sink.getNode(), sink.getNode().(RequestForgery::Sink).getKind(), source,
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"user-provided value"
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